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    A solution to the question "Why is there something rather than nothing?" is proposed that also 
entails a proposed solution to the question "Why do things exist?". In brief, I propose that a thing 
exists if it is a grouping.  A grouping ties stuff together into a unit whole and is visually seen and 
physically or mentally present as an edge, boundary, or enclosing surface that defines what is tied 
together into the unit whole and that, therefore, defines what is contained within.  This grouping, or 
enclosing surface, gives "substance" and existence to the thing as a new unit whole that's a different 
existent entity than whatever is contained within.  This grouping argument is used to resolve several 
mereological issues such as the special composition question, the problem of the many, etc.  Next, in 
regard to the question "Why is there something rather than nothing?", when we get rid of all existent 
entities including matter, energy, space/volume, time, abstract concepts, laws or constructs of 
physics/math/logic, possible worlds/possibilities, properties, consciousness, and minds, including the 
mind of the person trying to imagine this supposed lack of all, we think what is left is the lack of all 
existent entities, or "absolute nothing" (here, I don't mean our mind's conception of this "absolute 
nothing", I mean "absolute nothing" itself, in which all minds, including the mind of the person 
imagining this, would be gone).  This situation is very hard to visualize because the mind is trying to 
imagine a situation in which it doesn't exist.  But, once everything is gone, and the mind is gone, this 
"absolute nothing" would, by its very nature, completely define the situation (e.g., the "lack of all"). 
That is, the very lack of all would itself be the "all".  It would be everything, and the entirety or whole 
amount of all that is present.  Is there anything else besides that "absolute nothing"?  No. It is 
"nothing", and it is all.  An entirety/”the all"/whole amount/completely defined is a grouping, which 
means that the situation we previously considered to be "absolute nothing" is itself an existent entity.  
The surface of this entity isn't some separate structure; instead, it is the entirety/whole amount/"the all"
grouping itself that is the surface.  Said another way, by its very nature, "absolute nothing"/"the all" 
defines itself and is therefore the beginning point in the chain of being able to define existent entities in
terms of other existent entities.  One might say that being a grouping is a property so how can it be 
there in "nothing"?  The answer is that the property of being a grouping only appears after all else, 
including all properties and the mind of the person trying to imagine this, is gone.  Another way to say 
this argument for how “nothing” can be a “something” is to make the analogy between the question 
"Why is there something rather than nothing?" and the idea that you that you start with a 0 (e.g., 
"nothing") and end up with a 1 (e.g., "something"). Because you can't change a 0 into a 1, the only 
way you can do this is if that 0 really wasn't a 0 but was actually a 1 in disguise, even though it looks 
like a 0 on the surface.  Overall, it is argued that "something" is necessary because even what we 
previously considered to be "nothing" is a "something".  This isn't a new idea, but, to the best of the 
author's knowledge, providing a mechanism for why "nothing" is a "something" is.
Brief summary of a proposed solution to the question “Why is there something rather 
than nothing?”
    Before beginning: In reading this paper, it's very important to distinguish between the mind's 
conception of "nothing" and "nothing" itself, in which the mind would not be there.  These are two 
different things.  Of course, one can't directly visualize "nothing" itself because, as just mentioned, the 
mind would not be there, but you can try to imagine it as closely as possible and then try and 
extrapolate what it would be like if the mind weren't there.
    Gefter (2014) has suggested that the seeming insolubility of the question "Why is there something 
rather than nothing?" is based on a flawed assumption. I agree and propose the following. I think the 
flaw is that we assume the situation we often visualize as being "absolute nothing" (e.g., the lack of all 
matter, energy, space/volume, time, abstract concepts, laws or constructs of physics/math/logic, 
possible worlds/possibilities, properties, consciousness, and minds, including the mind of the person 
trying to imagine this supposed lack of all) really is the lack of all existent entities. Instead, I think this 
situation is itself an existent entity, or a "something". If so, this means that "something" is necessary, 
or non-contingent, because even what we used to think of as "absolute nothing" is a something. How 
can this be? The proposed explanation is below.  First though, because of the double meaning of the 
words "nothing" and "something", from now on, I will enclose the phrases "nothing", the "absolute lack-
of-all", "non-existence" and "something" in quotes.  In regard to the question "Why is there something 
rather than nothing?", two possible solutions are:
A. “Something” has always been here.
B. “Something” has not always been here.
    Choice A is possible but doesn’t explain anything; although, more will be said about it at the end of 
this paragraph.  This suggests that choice B has more explanatory power. Another benefit of choice B 
is that in order to ever provide a satisfying answer to the question "Why is there something rather than 
nothing?", I think we're going to have to address the idea that maybe there could have been “nothing” 
but now there is “something”. This is choice B.  So, if we go with choice B, if “something” has not 
always been here, then “nothing” must have been here before it.  In other words, there was "nothing" 
and now there is "something". Now, if this supposed "nothing” before the "something" was truly the 
lack of all existent entities, there would be no mechanism present to change, or transform, this 
“nothingness” into the “something” that is here now. But, because we can see that “something” is here 
now, the only possible choice is that the supposed “nothing” we were thinking of was not in fact the 
lack of all existent entities, or absolute “nothing”, but was instead a "something".  This is logically 
required if we go with choice B, and I don’t think there’s a way around that.  Another way to say this is 
to make the analogy between the question "Why is there something rather than nothing?" and the idea
that you that you start with a 0 (e.g., "nothing") and end up with a 1 (e.g., "something"). Because you 
can't change a 0 into a 1, the only way you can do this is if that 0 really wasn't a 0 but was actually a 1 
in disguise, even though it looks like a 0 on the surface.  That is, from our traditional way of thinking 
about "nothing", it just looks like "nothing".  But, if we could think about, or visualize, "nothing" in a 
different way, we could see that it now looks like a "something". "Nothing" and "something" are not 
different things; they're just two ways of describing the same situation: the lack of all entities we 
usually think of as existing.  Overall, this idea leads to the result that “something” is necessary 
because even what we used to think of as the lack of all existent entities, or “nothing”, is a 
“something”. Ironically, going with choice B leads to choice A. If what we used to think of as "absolute 
nothing" is actually an existent entity, or a "something", this would always have been true, which 
means that this "something" would always have been here.
    This next point is important: While the words "was" and "then"/"now " in the above imply a temporal 
change, time would not exist until there was "something", so I don't use these words in a time sense. 
Instead, I suggest that the two different words, “nothing” and “something”, describe the same situation 
(e.g., "the lack of all"), and that the human mind can view the switching between the two different 
words, or ways of visualizing "the lack of all", as a temporal change from "was" to "now".
    Instead of insisting that "nothing" can't be a "something" and refusing to continue, it's more useful to
follow the logic described above and try to figure out how "nothing" can be a "something".  So, how 
can this be?  I think it's first important to try and figure out why any “normal” thing (like a book, or a set)
can exist and be a “something”.  I propose that a thing exists if it is a grouping that ties stuff together to
create a new unit whole. By tying stuff together, the grouping defines what is contained within.  This 
grouping together of what is contained within provides a surface, or boundary, that defines what is 
contained within, that we can see and touch as the surface of the thing and that gives "substance" and
existence to the thing.  This surface or boundary doesn't have some magical power to give existence 
to stuff. But, it is is the visual and physical manifestation of the grouping together of stuff into a new 
unit whole or existent entity.  Another way of thinking about a unit whole is as a “unity”. This idea of an 
existent entity, or object, as a grouping (or bundle), oneness or unity (what is called here a unit whole) 
is not a new one (reviewed in Laycock, 2017). Indeed, the originator of the question “Why is there 
something rather than nothing?” (Leibniz, 1714) said “I do not conceive of any reality at all as without 
genuine unity.” (Leibniz, 1687).  One example of a grouping together or unit whole/unity is a book.  In 
the case of a book, the grouping together of all the individual ink and paper atoms and the bonds 
between these atoms creates a new and unique existent entity called a “book”, which is a different 
existent entity than the atoms and bonds inside considered individually. This grouping is present as 
the surface of the book that we see and can touch and that we call the "book".  Try to imagine a book 
that has no surface defining what is contained within. Even if you remove the cover, the collection of 
pages that’s left still has a surface. How do you even touch or see something without a surface? You 
can’t because it wouldn’t exist.  As a different example, consider the concept of an automobile. This is 
a mental construct in the head that groups together individual concepts/constructs labeled “tire”, 
“engine”, “car body”, etc. into a new and unique entity labeled as the concept “automobile”. Here, the 
grouping is not seen as a physical surface but as the mental label “automobile” for the collection of 
subconcepts considered together. But, this construct still exists because it’s a grouping defining what 
is contained within. One last example is that of a set. Does a set exist before the rule or list defining 
what elements are contained within is present?  No. The rule or the complete list of elements is 
required for the set to exist.  So, in conclusion, a grouping tying things together and defining what is 
contained within is an existent entity.
    Next, let's apply this definition of why a thing exists to the question of "Why is there something 
rather than nothing?" To start, "absolute nothing", or "non-existence", is first defined to mean: no 
matter, energy, space/volume, time, abstract concepts, laws or constructs of physics/math/logic, 
possible worlds/possibilities, properties, consciousness, and minds, including the mind of the person 
trying to imagine this supposed lack of all. Now, try to visualize this. When we get rid of all this stuff, 
we think what is left is the lack of all existent entities, or "absolute nothing" (here, I don't mean our 
mind's conception of this supposed "absolute nothing", I mean the supposed "absolute nothing" itself, 
in which all minds would be gone).  This situation is very hard to visualize because the mind is trying 
to imagine a situation in which it doesn't exist.  But, once everything is gone and the mind is gone, this
situation, this "absolute nothing", would, by its very nature, define the situation completely.  This 
"nothing" would be it; it would be the all.  It would be the entirety, or whole amount, of all that is 
present.  Is there anything else besides that "absolute nothing"?  No.  It is "nothing", and it is the all. 
An entirety/defined completely/whole amount/"the all" is a grouping, where what is tied together is 
“nothing”/"the all, which means that the situation we previously considered to be "absolute nothing" is 
itself an existent entity.  Only once all things, including our minds, are gone does “nothing” become 
"the all" and a new unit whole that we can then, after the fact, see from the outside as a whole unit. 
The surface, or boundary, of this existent entity isn't some separate structure. It's the entirety/whole 
amount/"the all" grouping itself.  Said another way, by its very nature, "absolute nothing"/"the all" 
defines itself and is therefore the beginning point in the chain of being able to define existent entities in
terms of other existent entities.  One might object and say that being a grouping is a property so how 
can it be there in "nothing"? The answer is that the property of being a grouping (e.g., the all grouping)
only appears after all else, including all properties and the mind of the person trying to imagine this, is 
gone.  What this means is that "something" is necessary, or non-contingent, because even what we 
previously, and incorrectly, visualized as the lack of all existent entities, or "nothing", is a "something. 
While this is not a new idea, the current paper presents a physical mechanism for how this can be.
    One objection that often comes up is that by talking about "nothing", I'm reifying, or giving existence,
to it, and this is what makes "nothing" seem like "something".  But, this objection is incorrect for two 
related reasons.  First, it confuses "nothing" itself and the mind's conception of "nothing".  These are 
two different things.  This means that the mind's conception of "nothing" and, therefore, our talking 
about "nothing" have no effect on "nothing" itself or on whether or not "nothing" itself is an existent 
entity.  Said another way, whether or not "nothing" itself exists is independent of our talking about it. 
Second, the objection also ignores the fact that in order to even discuss the topic, we have to talk 
about "nothing" as if it's a thing. It's okay to do this because, as just mentioned, our talking about it 
won't affect whether or not "nothing" itself actually is a thing.
    Another objection is that "non-existence" is usually meant as the lack of all existent things, so how 
could "non-existence" exist?  The counters to this argument are first that humans are stuck with 
having to define "non-existence" as the lack of all existent things, but "non-existence" itself does not 
have this constraint.  Whether or not "non-existence" itself (not our mind's conception of it) exists 
would be independent of "existence" and of our way of having to define it as the lack of all existent 
things. Second, the property of being a grouping, and therefore an existent entity, only appears after 
all existent things, including the mind, are gone.
    The above is the main body of the argument, and the remaining sections just provide additional 
details.  Readers not so interested in philosophy may either want to stop here or read the first part of 
the next section about the pile of dirt because it provides more justification for the idea that a thing 
exists if it's a grouping.  After that, skip to the section about "nothing" being a grouping.
A thing exists if it is a grouping that ties stuff together into a unit whole
    As discussed above, I suggest that a thing exists if it is a grouping.  A grouping ties stuff together 
into a unit whole and is visually seen and physically, or mentally, present as an edge, boundary, or 
enclosing surface that defines what is tied together in the unit whole.  This grouping, or enclosing 
surface, gives "substance" and existence to the thing as a new unit whole that's different than 
whatever is contained within.  As described above, the idea of an existent entity, or object, as a 
grouping, oneness or unity (what is called here a unit whole) is not a new one (Laycock, 2017), but its 
use in answering the question "Why is there something rather than nothing?" is new, at least to the 
best of the author's knowledge.  So, what is the rationale for this argument that a thing exists if it's a 
grouping?  To illustrate, I use the example of a pile of dirt. Why does a pile of dirt exist? Three things 
that might give existence to the pile of dirt are:
1.) The individual molecules of dirt and the bonds between the molecules of dirt inside the pile.
2.) The surface of the pile. Note that a surface is a boundary that delimits what's in the pile from what's
not in the pile.
3.) Something outside the pile.
    Discussing the last choice first, if the reason for existence of the pile were something, A, external to 
the pile, one would then have to ask why that external thing A exists? Using the same logic, it would 
be because of something called B external to it. Then, one would have to ask why B exists. To avoid 
an infinite regress, there would eventually have to be some thing that exists for reasons intrinsic, and 
not external, to it. Because that would be equivalent to asking the original question of why the pile of 
dirt exists without considering the external option, I will no longer pursue the external option.
    So, that leaves two choices for why a thing, like a pile of dirt, exists: the stuff inside the pile (e.g., 
the individual molecules of dirt and the bonds between them), and the surface of the pile. Evidence 
supporting the grouping/surface argument and against the stuff inside argument is as follows:
1.) Suppose it's not the surface that gives existence to the pile but, instead, is just the stuff inside the 
pile; that is, the individual dirt molecules and the bonds between them. One might then ask: why does 
a dirt molecule exist?" The stuff-inside reasoning would say that it exists because of the stuff inside it, 
e.g., the atoms making up the dirt molecule and the electromagnetic forces that hold the atoms 
together. Then, one might ask why does a dirt molecule atom or an electromagnetic force exist?" The 
stuff-inside reasoning would say that they exist because of the stuff inside them (e.g., the neutrons, 
protons, and electrons making up the atom and the photons making up the electromagnetic force 
between the nucleus and the electrons).  Just as above, this process could obviously go on forever. At
some point, to avoid an infinite regress of explaining that things exist because of smaller and smaller 
stuff inside and in order to have anything exist at all, there must be some smallest, most fundamental 
thing that exists that has absolutely no smaller components contained within.  An existent entity with 
no smaller components inside would seem to be just a surface. That is, there's nothing inside, and it 
exists. What else would it be besides the surface? And, this brings us back to the idea that it's the 
surface, grouping or relationship defining what is contained within that causes a thing to exist and not 
the stuff inside. One might object and say that instead of nothing inside, there's just continuous 
“something”, or “substance, inside.  That is possible, but then you have to explain: why does that 
continuous substance exist? It can't exist because of what's inside since it has no subunits.  It could 
also exist for no reason whatsoever (it just is), which, is similar to choice A in the previous section 
(“something has always been here”). This is possible but doesn't explain anything. This, then, gets 
back again to the idea that a pile of dirt exists because it is a grouping, as represented by its surface.
2.) Next, a thing like a pile of dirt is not just a bunch of dirt molecules considered individually. It's the 
grouping together of these individual molecules into a new unit whole called a pile. The pile is a 
different existent entity than the individual dirt molecules considered on their own. All the individual dirt
molecules could be spread out individually over a section of land, and they wouldn't be considered a 
pile; they'd just be called dirt molecules on a section of land. But, group them together into a little hill, 
and a new unit whole called a pile is created. So, the grouping together of dirt molecules is what 
causes the pile to exist. A grouping together of dirt molecules is visually seen and physically present 
as the boundary or surface defining what dirt molecules are contained within the pile. So, once again, 
the boundary or surface of the pile groups together the dirt molecules and gives "substance" and 
existence to the pile.
Another example of this is that of a hole in a block of wood. Before a hole is cut in a block of wood, the
stuff inside the future hole is just a bunch of unrelated, individual locations in the block of wood. There 
is nothing grouping them together into a separate unit whole. But, cutting the hole in the wood creates 
a surface that groups these locations together into a new unit whole called a hole. The surface, or 
wall, of the hole defines what locations are contained within and creates the new unit whole called the 
hole.
3.) One might say that what makes the pile of dirt exist is all the bonds between the dirt molecules 
inside the pile, and because these bonds exist inside the pile, it's not the surface of the pile that makes
it exist. This is a fair point, but three arguments against it are:
A. First off, a bond itself is a grouping.  A bond is the connection between two or more atoms or 
molecules.  There is no bond without the things being bonded together.  So a bond is really the 
grouping of the two atoms or molecules along with the shared electrons or force molecules going 
between them.
B. Bonds between molecules might explain why a thing of many components might exist, but they 
don't explain why a thing that has no smaller components inside (and therefore no bonds between 
the components) exists. As explained above, a smallest entity with no further components inside is 
required to avoid an infinite regress of smaller and smaller things inside but still allow anything to 
exist at all. So, at this level, it can't be the bonds inside that cause a thing to exist because there is 
no inside. All that's left to cause the thing to exist is the surface that defines what is contained 
within (which in this case is "nothing").
C. It's not the bonds (between dirt molecules) considered individually that causes the pile to exist. 
It's the collection of all these bonds in the pile considered together. That is, it's a grouping of all the 
bonds together that cause the pile to exist.  This grouping together of all the bonds causes a 
surface, or boundary, defining what bonds are contained within and that we can see and touch as 
the surface of the pile. So, this again supports the idea that it's the grouping, as represented by the 
surface, that ties together and defines what is contained within that causes a thing to exist.
4.) Finally, try to imagine how a thing like a pile of dirt, or a book, could exist without an outermost 
edge or surface.  No matter if your eyesight is so good you can see anything that exists no matter how
small it is, what you're still seeing is the surface of the thing.  Is a thing really there, or even 
visualizable, if it has no surface?  I don't think so.
    In sum, I propose that a thing exists if it is a grouping.  A grouping ties stuff together into a unit 
whole and is visually seen and physically or mentally present as an edge, boundary, or enclosing 
surface that defines what is tied together and contained within the unit whole.  This grouping, or 
enclosing surface, gives "substance" and existence to the thing as a new unit whole that's a different 
existent entity than whatever is contained within.  Some additional examples of existent entities and 
their groupings defining what is contained within are as follows. First, consider a book. In this case, the
grouping together of all the individual ink and paper atoms and the bonds between these atoms 
creates a new and unique existent entity called a “book”, which is a different existent entity than the 
atoms and bonds inside considered individually. This grouping provides the surface that we see and 
can touch and that we call the "book".  Try to imagine a book that has no surface defining what is 
contained within. Even if you remove the cover, the collection of pages that’s left still has a surface. 
How do you even touch, see, or visualize something without a surface? You can’t because it wouldn’t 
exist.  Additional examples are as follows.  A grouping together of chalk molecules with adjacent 
positions on a board creates a new existent entity called a chalk circle. The grouping of molecules is 
visually seen as the the edge of the chalk circle.  A cloud exists because there is a grouping together 
of water molecules in the sky that we classify in our minds as a cloud.  Different minds may consider 
different groupings of these water molecules as the cloud.  Each of these groupings exist 
independently in the minds of those imagining them.  The actual cloud in the sky would be the 
grouping of those water molecules whose bonds with each other are stronger than the air currents 
trying to blow them apart.  More on the issue of the cloud is discussed below in the section on "The 
problem of the many".  A photon, the carrier of electromagnetic energy, is a grouping together of 
oscillating electric and magnetic fields, and their locations in space-time.  This grouping makes the 
photon an existent thing that's different than the electric and magnetic fields considered on their own 
without this grouping.  Finally, think about a set of elements. If it were unknown what elements are 
contained in a set, would that set exist? No. Even for the null set, it's known exactly what is contained 
within: the lack of all elements. The grouping defining what elements are contained within is essential 
for a set to exist. The grouping is visually represented by the curly braces, or surface/edge, around the
elements of the set and is what gives existence to the set.
    The reasoning that a thing exists if it's a grouping also applies to abstract objects. In the mind, an 
abstract concept labeled “love” is a grouping that ties together other ideas and concepts (“trust”, 
“intimacy”, memories of love-related emotions or physiological responses, etc.) into a new unit whole 
called the concept "love".  If you remove the grouping, then you no longer have the concept called 
“love”, you just have a bunch of unrelated, individual ideas and concepts like “trust”, “intimacy”, etc., 
but they're not grouped together into a new concept labeled “love”. In general, for non-mind existent 
entities, the grouping defining what is contained within is equivalent to the surface of the entity.  But, 
for existent entities in the mind, like abstract concepts, the grouping defining what is contained within 
is still equivalent to a surface or boundary but can be better thought of as the label the mind gives to 
the concept. That is, the mental label of “love” is the surface or boundary defining what other mental 
constructs like “trust”, “intimacy”, etc. are contained within the concept labeled “love”.
    Some have questioned the role of the edge, or periphery, in defining an existent entity. For 
instance, Goldstick (1979) writes
“There is no more basis for identifying a hole with its periphery than for doing the same with a 
bump. Rather, a hole and a bump are what are contained within those spatial bounds.”
This statement is flawed for the following reason. First, of course the stuff contained within is 
necessary for a thing to exist (even if that stuff is "nothing" as for the null set), but it's not sufficient. 
Without the grouping together of that stuff into a new unit whole called a hole or a bump that is visually
seen as the edge or periphery of the hole or bump, the "stuff inside" is just a bunch of individual "stuff".
Goldstick's use of the phrase "what are contained within those spatial bounds" seems to say as much. 
Without the edge or periphery, there would be no "within" and no "spatial bounds" in the phrase "what 
are contained within those spatial bounds". The "within" means within the edge or periphery.  Now, 
this edge or periphery doesn't have some magical power to give existence to stuff.  But, it is is the 
visual and physical manifestation of the grouping together of stuff into a new unit whole or existent 
entity. Said another way, without "those spatial bounds" defining what components are contained 
within, the air particles within a hole or the matter particles within a bump would be just a bunch of air 
or matter particles with no relationship tying them together into a new unit whole called a hole or 
bump. For the hole, the spatial bound is the surface/edge of the material in which the hole is located. 
Can you imagine a hole without its enclosing surface that defines it?  I can't.  For the bump, just like 
the pile of dirt described above, the grouping together of all the individual molecules of matter and the 
bonds and forces between them creates a new unit whole called the bump that's a different existent 
entity than the molecules and bonds inside considered individually. The visual representation, or the 
spatial bound, of this grouping together is the surface of the bump. Without "those spatial bounds", 
there would be no hole or bump to talk about.
    One may argue against the materialist view and say that some abstract objects exist neither in the 
mind/head nor in the physical world outside the mind/head but, instead, in some sort of abstract, mind-
independent Platonic realm. While this mythical realm can neither be observed nor rationally 
defended, even if some objects did exist in it, the reason they would exist is because they're 
groupings, or relationships defining what is contained within. Additionally, abstract objects are 
considered to be without spatiotemporal location and causal efficacy (Linnebo, 2011; Rosen, 2012) 
meaning that they can't cause anything to happen. So, even if abstract objects did exist in a Platonic 
realm, they have no bearing on our universe, which does contain spatiotemporal locations and in 
which things happen.
Implications of the idea that a thing exists if it's a grouping
    A direct consequence of the idea that a thing exists if it is a grouping that ties stuff together into a 
unit whole and therefore defines what is contained within is that until after the grouping is complete, so
that what the grouping groups together is exactly defined and the unit is whole, there is no grouping, 
and the thing does not exist. Only after the grouping is complete and what is tied together within is 
fully defined does the grouping and, therefore the thing itself, exist. If 9 out of 10 of the elements of a 
set are defined, the set still does not exist. A different set with just 9 elements could be defined as 
existing, but the set with 10 elements does not yet exist. This is basically a mereological essentialism-
type approach (Chisholm, 1973; Feldman and Feldman, 2008), and it will be further discussed below. 
One benefit of this approach is that one can use this idea to resolve the Russell Paradox (Granet, 
2001).
    Another consequence of the idea that a thing, such as a set, exists if it is a grouping that ties stuff 
together into a unit whole and therefore defines what is contained within is that a thing exists only 
where and when its grouping defining what is tied together exists. This grouping/existent entity can be 
located either inside or outside the mind. Note that by “mind”, I mean the materialistic view of the mind
as being composed of physical things contained within the physical brain, but the following examples 
still apply even if the mind is an immaterial thing located in some mythical Platonic realm.  What this 
means is that unicorns do exist, but only in the minds of those thinking about them and not outside the
mind.  Also, the mental constructs that each person labels "unicorn" are all different existent entities 
that exist only in those particular minds.  Another example is that of properties.  Where do properties 
exist?  Consider the example of a red apple on a table. The physical apple and the electromagnetic 
wave that makes up the red light reflected from it each exist as different existent entities outside the 
mind. The idea of "redness", which is usually thought of as a property of things and not a thing itself, is
actually an existent entity (e.g. a neural construct, or set of neurons, ion gradients, etc.) in the mind. 
"Redness" is the mind's label that groups together other neural constructs such as the construct for 
the language word "red" and the constructs of the memories and the physiological sensations felt in 
the past when red wavelengths of light entered the eye and were processed by the brain. Every 
sighted person has his or her own neural construct called "redness".  These individual “redness” 
constructs are all somewhat similar, but not identical, because we all have similar, but not identical, 
memories, physiologies and minds.  So, even properties are existent entities that are located in the 
mind and are linked to other existent entities like the neural construct called the "visual image of an 
apple". By being linked, one associates the entity/property "red" with the apple. Some feel that the 
property "redness" is an abstract entity that doesn't exist separately in each mind, but I would ask 
where does this abstract entity exist if not outside the mind or inside the mind? Where is this Platonic 
realm where abstract concepts exist? Until someone can point out where this realm exists, this is 
purely a faith-based argument, which while possible, can't be argued rationally.
    A third consequence of the grouping idea is that groupings that differ either in what is tied together, 
where the grouping exists, or when the grouping exists are different groupings and different existent 
entities that are independent and distinct from one another.  For instance, seemingly identical 
groupings of stuff (like electrons) that exist in different places or times are distinct and separate 
existent entities.
    To explore this idea that a thing exists only where and when its grouping, or definition of what is 
contained within, is present, consider the example of a bag, A, of ten specific grocery items. Several 
bag-related groupings (e.g. existent things) can exist in several different locations including:
1.) The actual physical instance of the bag of groceries, A, containing ten specific grocery 
items G1, G2...G10 and located at position B and time C. Here, the bag groups together ten 
specific grocery items within the bag, which means that an existent entity called bag of 
groceries A is present. The ten individual grocery items all exist on their own, but the bag 
groups them together into a separate existent thing called bag of groceries A. The existent 
entities that are the individual grocery items will be discussed more below. Note that once the 
bag, A, exists, if one then, after the fact, replaces one of the items with another item, G11, this 
is no longer bag of grocery items A. It is a new and distinct existent entity called bag of grocery 
items A1 because the stuff that is grouped together has changed. One of the items is different, 
so the grouping defining what is contained within is different, so the existent entity is different. 
Note also that if one removes the grocery items from the bag, the existent entity called the bag 
of grocery items A at location B and time C no longer exists because the definition of what is 
grouped together is different.  While the bags of groceries with different items in them may be 
technically different existent entities according to the definitions proposed here, in every day 
life, one can collapse these different entities together into one entity to say they're all the same 
grocery bag.  This example illustrates why the approach proposed here is basically the same 
as mereological essentialism (Chisholm, 1973; Feldman and Feldman, 2008). Mereological 
essentialism is the view that “if a compound thing W has a certain part P, then W cannot exist 
without having P as a part.” (Feldman and Feldman, 2008). However, mereological 
essentialism can be collapsed to mereological “everydayism” for use in every day life. This idea
of collapse of many different existent entities into one seems reminiscent of how one's 
observation collapses a quantum wave function of many different possibilities into a single 
outcome.
2.) The neural construct in our mind called the visual image of the particular bag of grocery 
items A at position B and time C.
3.) A different neural construct in our mind named the "concept of a bag of groceries". This 
mental construct labeled the "concept of a bag of groceries" is a grouping of all the other 
mental constructs associated with it such as "grocery bag" and "grocery items". By grouping 
these other constructs together, the mental construct called the "concept of a bag of groceries" 
exists on its own within the mind. As an aside, what we think of as general concepts usually 
have specific labels, time and location stamps removed from their component mental 
constructs. This is why the "concept of a bag of groceries" doesn't have the specific stamps of 
bag A at location B and time C associated with it.
    The above three bag of grocery-related groupings are all separate existent things that exist in 
different locations either outside the mind or at some location within the mind. This example illustrates 
the point that any thing that exists exists only within a certain location or domain. For instance, some 
things like physical instances of bags of groceries exist only outside the mind, and some things like the
"concept of a bag of groceries" exist only inside a mind. Each different mind contains its own different 
existent grouping called the "concept of a bag of groceries". Another example of an existent thing that 
only exists within the mind is that of the mental construct called the "concept of a unicorn". This 
grouping, or mental construct has real existence, but this real existence is only as a grouping within a 
mind. There is no instantiation of it outside-the-mind, as far as we know. So, whenever a thing is said 
to exist, it's very important to say within what location, domain or reference frame it exists and at what 
time it exists. As with the unicorn, a thing can exist in one reference frame but not another. A corollary 
of this is that the mind's conception of a thing is not the same as the thing itself. The mind's conception
of a thing and the thing itself are two different existent entities that exist in different locations. The 
implications of this idea for the question "Why is there something rather than nothing?" were 
discussed above and are discussed again below. 
    A grouping, e.g., an existent entity, may or may not contain other existent things within it with their 
own groupings or edges. These internal things exist on their own because of their own 
groupings/edges, but where they exist is only within the confines, or domain, of the external existent 
thing. Using the bag of groceries example, a bag may or may not contain individually existing grocery 
items within it. If it does contain grocery items, then these items exist on their own because of their 
own groupings/edges, but the enclosing surface of the bag gives existence to the entire grouping of 
these things as a separate, existent whole thing called a bag of groceries. Additionally, because the 
groupings/edges of the individual grocery items are located inside the bag, they exist only within the 
confines of the paper bag. As long as they stay inside the bag, these items exist only inside the bag, 
and one cannot say that they exist outside the bag. If one takes out one of the items, then it exists 
outside the bag and no longer exists inside the bag. Indeed, if one takes out one of the items, then the
original bag of groceries no longer exists either because the definition of what is contained within has 
changed. Instead, a new bag of groceries exists with one fewer item. While the above may all be 
logically consistent, in every day life, as described above, one can use "mereological everydayism" to 
collapse this technical difference down to just saying they're the same bag of groceries and that the 
items inside the bag also exist outside the bag. Taken together, a grouping, or existent entity, may 
contain other groupings within it, but these internal groupings/existent entities only exist within the 
confines of the external grouping. As described above, it's very important to say within what location, 
domain or reference frame a thing exists and at what time it exists. 
    Combining the idea that a thing, such as a set, exists if it is a grouping that ties stuff together with 
the related idea that a thing exists where and when its grouping is located gives the result that two 
seemingly identical (in appearance, properties, etc.) groupings are two different existent entities 
because they're separate groupings in different locations. This means, for instance, that the existent 
entity that is the concept of the number "one" in Joe's head is a distinct existent entity than the concept
of the number "one" in Jane's head. These entities may look the same and have the same properties, 
but they're distinct existent entities in two different locations.
Implications for mereology
    Some examples of the above reasoning applied to well-known mereological (study of parts and 
wholes) puzzles are as follows. The solutions to these paradoxes all rely on the ideas that a thing 
exists where and when its grouping exists, that seemingly identical groupings in different locations or 
times are unique and distinct existent entities, and that the mind's conception of a thing is a different 
existent entity than the thing itself.
1.) Special composition question and unrestricted composition, or universalism: The Special 
composition question, SCQ,  (van Inwagen, 1987; van Inwagen, 1990) asks under which conditions 
some objects together compose a further object (Korman, 2014), and unrestricted composition, or 
universalism, says that for any objects, the collection of those objects is always a further object. For 
example, if both a mosquito in Iowa and Barack Obama are existent entities, the SCQ would ask when
do these together form a further object, and unrestricted composition would say always. Is this true? 
Using the reasoning described above, an object containing a mosquito in Iowa and Barack Obama 
doesn't automatically exist but could exist if a grouping of them exists. Obviously, there is no grouping 
of these things outside the mind, but there could be a grouping of them inside a mind if someone were
to think of them grouped together. The grouping would therefore only exist in the mind of the person 
grouping them together.  This answers the SCQ and makes the argument for restricted composition: 
Some objects only form a further object if there is a grouping together of them, and that subsequent 
object exists only when and where the grouping exists.
2.) The problem of the many: This paradox relates to any objects whose borders are not perfectly 
sharp, which at the microscopic level, is basically all objects (Weatherson, 2014) . It is best explained 
using the example of a single cloud in a clear sky. As Lewis (1993) writes:
“Think of a cloud―just one cloud, and around it a clear blue sky. Seen from the ground, the 
cloud may seem to have a sharp boundary. Not so. The cloud is a swarm of water droplets. At 
the outskirts of the cloud, the density of the droplets falls off. Eventually they are so few and far
between that we may hesitate to say that the outlying droplets are still part of the cloud at all; 
perhaps we might better say only that they are near the cloud. But the transition is gradual. 
Many surfaces are equally good candidates to be the boundary of the cloud. Therefore many 
aggregates of droplets, some more inclusive and some less inclusive (and some inclusive in 
different ways than others), are equally good candidates to be the cloud. Since they have equal
claim, how can we say that the cloud is one of these aggregates rather than another? But if all 
of them count as clouds, then we have many clouds rather than one. And if none of them 
count, each one being ruled out because of the competition from the others, then we have no 
cloud. How is it, then, that we have just one cloud? And yet we do.”
The reasoning presented in this paper provides a resolution to this problem. Remember that a thing 
exists only where and when its grouping is. The grouping can be either inside the mind or outside the 
mind.  Also, the mind's conception of a thing, like a cloud, is a different existent entity than the thing 
itself.  Therefore, when Lewis writes: 
“Many surfaces are equally good candidates to be the boundary of the cloud. Therefore many 
aggregates of droplets, some more inclusive and some less inclusive (and some inclusive in 
different ways than others), are equally good candidates to be the cloud.”
he's right that each of these many "equally goods cloud candidates" does exist, but each exists only in
the minds of the individual observers.  Indeed, one observer may have many different existent mental 
representations of the cloud in his/her mind, each with its own grouping.  This is because the observer
may say to him/herself: Well, the boundary of the cloud could be there, or over to the right a little bit, or
over a little bit more. Inside the mind, each of these groupings would be a unique mental grouping of 
the cloud and therefore each would be a unique existent entity.  A different observer might be thinking 
of totally different groupings and those would exist in his/her head.  Each of these cloud constructs 
exists in these peoples' minds as long as their particular mental groupings exist.  Outside the mind, it 
is suggested that only one cloud grouping exists, and that is the one dictated by natural (outside the 
mind) forces.  By this reasoning, the cloud is the grouping that ties together those water droplets 
where the forces/bonds that hold these droplets together are stronger than the forces/bonds trying to 
drive them apart (e.g. the wind or Brownian motion).  However, each observer may formulate his/her 
own rule for what constitutes the cloud outside the mind.  This means that there is only one cloud 
outside the mind/head at any one time that meets a given definition of a cloud inside the mind, but 
until a consensus is reached, the observers cannot agree on what that one outside-the-mind cloud is. 
Also, using the natural forces rule, as the wind becomes stronger, the water droplets that meet the 
grouping definition change, and thus the composition of the cloud changes. Each cloud composition 
only exists for a short time as the wind changes. Overall, the issue with the problem of the many is 
due to confusing the many inside-the-mind/head cloud existent entities with the outside-the-mind/head
cloud existent entity.
3.) Composition as identity and the co-location of objects: Composition as identity is the idea that 
an existent entity containing parts is not a different existent entity above and beyond just the parts 
themselves. The example of a chair with a screw-on leg has been used as evidence for this idea 
(Wallace, 2011).  The leg of such a chair seems like it is a grouping defining what is contained within 
and thus an existent entity. So does the chair. But, doesn't this mean that two different existent 
entities, the chair and the leg, are occupying the same location (e.g. that they're co-located), which 
seems impossible?  The solution is as follows. Outside the mind, there is only one chair leg.  It can 
exist as a subunit within the chair (similar to how a grocery item can exist as a component of a bag of 
groceries, see above) or as a chair leg on its own separate from the chair.  But, it can't be both at the 
same time.  That is, if you remove the chair leg from the chair, the chair containing the chair leg no 
longer exists (because that grouping is no longer present).  So, there is no co-location of both the 
chair leg and the chair-containing-the-leg. Inside the mind, the same reasoning applies.  A single 
mental representation of the chair leg can exist as a subunit within the mental representation of the 
chair or as a chair leg on its own separate from the chair.  But, the one mental representation can't be 
both at the same time, so there is no co-location.  One can have two mental representations of the 
chair leg, one on its own and one at the same time within the chair, but these are distinct existent 
entities, so again there is no co-location of the same existent entity. 
4.) Dion and Theon: This is a famous puzzle first proposed by the ancient philosopher Chrysippus. 
As told by Wasserman (2014):
“Dion is a normal human being and Theon is a large part of Dion consisting of everything but 
Dion's right foot. Suppose now that the right foot is removed. Theon obviously survives the 
operation, for his parts remain completely unchanged. But in that case it seems as if Dion does
not survive the operation, for otherwise we would have two people in the same place at the 
same time. Hence, Dion does not survive the loss of his foot.”
Does Dion cease to exist when his foot is amputated? Do Dion and Theon occupy the same space?  
Besides sounding like a soap opera, the solution to this puzzle is similar to the solution of the above 
chair-leg co-location puzzle. There is only one body-of-Dion-minus-the-foot unless you imagine a 
second Dion's body as a distinct existent entity, and in this case there would be no co-location of the 
same body.
"Absolute nothing" is a grouping and therefore an existent entity: Why is there 
“something” rather than “nothing”?
    In this section, the proposed solution to the question of “Why is there something rather than nothing 
described in the first section is first repeated and then discussed in more detail.  The proposed 
solution makes use of the definition of an existent thing as a grouping that ties stuff together into a unit
whole.  Here goes.  When we get rid of all existent entities including matter, energy, space/volume, 
time, abstract concepts, laws or constructs of physics/math/logic, possible worlds/possibilities, 
properties, consciousness, and minds, including the mind of the person trying to imagine this 
supposed lack of all, we think what is left is the lack of all existent entities, or "absolute nothing".  This 
situation is very hard to visualize because the mind is trying to imagine a situation in which it doesn't 
exist.  All one can do is to try and imagine a situation in which almost everything is gone and then 
extrapolate.  But, once everything is gone and the mind is gone, this situation, this "absolute lack-of-
all", would, by its very nature, define the situation completely.  It would define reality, or the lack 
thereof.  This "nothing" would be it; it would be the all.  It would be the entirety, or whole amount, of all 
that is present.  Is there anything else besides that "absolute nothing"?  No.  It is "nothing", and it is 
the all.  An entirety/defined completely/whole amount/"the all" is a grouping, where what is tied 
together is “nothing”/"the all, which means that the situation we previously considered to be "absolute 
nothing" is itself an existent entity.  Only once all things, including our minds, are gone does “nothing” 
become "the all" and a new unit whole that we can then, after the fact, see from the outside as a whole
unit. The surface, or boundary, of this existent entity isn't some separate structure. It's the 
entirety/whole amount/"the all" grouping itself.  Said another way, by its very nature, "absolute 
nothing"/"the all" defines itself and is therefore the beginning point in the chain of being able to define 
existent entities in terms of other existent entities.  One might object and say that being a grouping is a
property so how can it be there in "nothing"? The answer is that the property of being a grouping (e.g.,
the all grouping) only appears after all else, including all properties and the mind of the person trying 
to imagine this, is gone.  What this means is that "something" is necessary, or non-contingent, 
because even what we previously, and incorrectly, visualized as the lack of all existent entities, or 
"nothing", is a "something. 
    This reasoning for why the "absolute lack-of-all" is actually an existent entity is complementary to 
the what's inside argument described above for why a thing exists that showed that to avoid an infinite
regress of saying that a thing exists because of what's inside that thing and to still have anything exist 
at all, there must be some smallest, most fundamental existent entity that has an outermost surface 
and absolutely nothing further inside. That argument started from the assumption of an "existent" 
entity called a pile of dirt.  The current argument starts from the assumption of the "absolute lack-of-
all" or "non-existence". Both arguments come to the same conclusion but from different directions: that
there is a most fundamental existent entity that is a surface with "absolutely nothing" inside.
    If "non-existence" is actually an existent state, why is so hard to visualize it as such? One reason is 
that our minds are "trapped on the inside" in the existent stuff that has to be gotten rid of to get 
"nothing". By this, I mean that our minds, which exist, wouldn't be there when there's "nothing". Only 
once all things, including our minds, are gone does nothing become "the all" and a whole existent unit 
that we can then, after the fact, see from the outside as a whole unit.  Of course, we can't visualize this
directly, but what we can do is to try and visualize getting rid of as much as possible and then 
extrapolate. A related reason is that we're confusing our mind’s conception of "nothing" with "nothing" 
itself.  Because we exist, we think of "non-existence" as being dependent on and defined as the lack 
of what is traditionally thought to exist. But, "non-existence" itself does not have this requirement; it is 
independent of our mind (minds would not be present in “non-existence”) and of what is traditionally 
thought to exist. If we could somehow see "non-existence" itself and not just our mind’s conception of 
it, we would see that only once all, including the mind, is gone, does "non-existence" become the 
entirety of all that is present and, therefore, an existent entity.
    Some fruitful discussions of these ideas have occurred online. A paraphrased excerpt is as follows. 
The point was made there that saying that the “lack of all existent states”, or what is traditionally called
"non-existence", is equal to the existence of another entity is a contradiction. However, as described 
above, it's only once all existent states, properties and the mind are gone, does ”non-existence” 
become the “all” grouping and therefore become an existent entity. So, there is no contradiction 
because what we've traditionally called "non-existence" is not really the lack of all existent entities. It, 
itself, is the existent entity. Another way of saying this is that our past use of the phrases "the absolute 
lack-of-all" and "non-existence" are incorrect; they're misnomers. 
    Right now, if you're thinking "How can a 'grouping' be an existent thing? It's just an abstract or 
mental construct, not a real thing, and abstract things aren't real like our universe.", remember the 
following. First, the "nothing" grouping being discussed here is "nothing" itself and not the mind's 
abstract conception of "nothing". In "nothing" itself, the abstract concept of "nothing" would not be 
present. Second, consider an electron. An electron is considered to be a "real" particle and not just an 
abstract concept. But, what is an electron? What is the surface of an electron that defines what is 
contained within? And, what is inside an electron? No one knows. All we really know is that an 
electron is an existent entity. As such, it is really no different than the existent entity that has been 
previously referred to as "nothing". An existent entity is an existent entity. Whether or not this state is 
called an "electron" or "the entity previously called nothing" doesn't matter. Additionally, two groupings 
or two existent entities that were previously referred to as "nothing" and that are “looking at each 
other” would look as real to each other as two "real" existent entities called "electrons". It's all relative.
Conclusions
    Taken together, the above suggests that a thing exists because it is a grouping that ties stuff 
together to form a new unit whole, or existent entity.  A grouping is equivalent to an edge, boundary, or
enclosing surface defining what is tied together and contained within and giving "substance" and 
existence to the thing. A corollary of this is that a thing exists where and when its grouping exists. This
can be in a mind or outside the mind. Therefore, whenever a thing is said to exist, it's very important to
say within what location, domain or reference frame it exists and at what time it exists. A second 
corollary is that the mind's conception of an outside-the-mind existent entity and the outside-the-mind 
entity itself are two different existent entities. This argument for why a thing exists is then used to show
that "absolute nothing"/"non-existence", and not our mind's conception of "nothing", is a grouping and 
is, therefore, an existent entity. That is, what has traditionally been thought of as "nothing", or "non-
existence", is, when seen from this different perspective, actually an existent entity or "something". 
This means that the same situation (the supposed lack of all) can appear totally different depending on
the perspective of the observer. This also means that it's impossible to have a true lack of all existent 
entities, or "nothing", and, therefore, that "something" is necessary, or non-contingent. While this idea 
of an existent entity being a grouping is not a novel idea, to the best of the author's knowledge, its 
application to the question "Why is there something rather than nothing?" is.
    Using the proposed hypothesis, one could say that, thought of in one way, our reality is, at its base, 
the "absolute lack-of-all". If one could pull back the curtain and see what's really at the base of reality, 
one would find "non-existence". But, this "non-existence" is, when seen from a different perspective, 
an existent entity.  A similar idea to this is that of “wu (non-being) and yu (being)” (Chen, 1969) in the 
Tao Te Ching text of Chinese philosophy with wu giving rise to yu.
    What is this proposed solution to the question "Why is there something rather than nothing?" good 
for? Like all such solutions, one can never prove the above hypothesis because one can never 
actually directly see whether the supposed "absolute nothing" is itself an existent entity. But, what we 
can do is as follows.  Because there is nothing smaller than "nothing", the existent entity formerly 
called "the absolute lack of all" would be the smallest and most fundamental of existent entities and, 
as such, would be the fundamental building block of existence.  A similar idea was recently suggested 
by Bhattacharyya (2021), who stated “Finally, we argue that nonexistence may notionally constitute 
existence, and hence may be the fundamental.” Because the universe exists and has physical 
properties, this most fundamental of existent entities must therefore be the most basic building block 
of our existent universe and must have physical properties from which the physical properties of the 
universe are derived. So, we can develop a model of this most fundamental of existent entities and, 
use it to build a simple model of our existent universe.  If this model matches observations and can 
make testable predictions that are validated by observation, this provides evidence for the above 
solution. This is the scientific method. I refer to this approach as a metaphysics-to-physics approach or
philosophical engineering and think it is a way to turn metaphysics into a more science-like field. 
Without evidence from a model that people can see and use, we'll argue and argue about the subject 
forever without ever coming to any consensus. Obtaining evidence is the only way we'll be able to 
move forward. The author is currently working, very slowly, on building such a model. What this 
metaphysics-to-physics approach also means is that by discussing the question "Why is there 
something rather than nothing?, we are actually discussing fundamental physics.  Somewhat similar 
ideas have been proposed by Tegmark (2008) and Rickles (2010).
    Finally, philosophers may criticize this paper because it has little discussion of the history, 
philosophical context or philosophical meaning of the question "Why is there something rather than 
nothing?".  But, I am not a philosopher, so my goal is to try to answer the question and then use that 
answer to make progress in physics.   I think this should be the aim of all thinkers in this area instead 
of just talking about the question itself.
    Further details can be found at: https://sites.google.com/site/ralphthewebsite
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